Finance, Organization, and Impacts of U.S.
Much agricultural research, however, produces impure public goods which are partially excludable. Access to benefits of research may have a geographical dimension, (e.g., local, regional, national, or international), usefulness may be limited to particular plant or animal species, or strong intellectual property rights, e.g., patents, trade secrets, breeders' rights, may be politically, economically, and legally feasible giving owners sole right to control or license an innovation's use for a fixed period. For example, the U.S. patent system now gives an inventor the right to control the use of his/her discovery for 20 years.
Some examples illustrate partial excludability of benefits for scientific innovations. First, consider the public applied agricultural research at Kansas State University that led to a new hard red winter wheat variety in 1995 that was uniquely adapted to Kansas growing conditions and widely adopted by Kansas farmers in 1996 and 1997. Because the wheat variety is self-pollinated, farmers can save their own seed for replanting the following year. This use of so-called "bin-run" seed greatly reduces private sector interest in wheat varietal development. Benefits of the 1 research spilled across state boundaries in the sense that the new variety also replaced some acreage of older hard red winter wheat varieties in the surrounding states of Oklahoma, Colorado, and Nebraska, but in other states, the new variety was either not good enough to dislodge older varieties or hard red winter wheat is not grown.
Second, the discovery of the structure of DNA enabled later discoveries, some of which were patentable and generated large licensing revenue and new companies. That is, an intellectual property right system can be used to make excludability economically feasible and to convert discoveries into impure public goods that are marketable. For example, the discovery by Cohen year to a single application of one broad-spectrum herbicide. The average reduction in weed control cost, including the added cost of the technology fee, has been about $10 per acre (Carlson, Marra, and Hubbell 1997) . Roundup Ready soybeans allow farmers to plant in narrow rows or drill seeds, which reduces soil erosion over wide-row planting and crowds out some weeds. Farmers, however, must forego saving and using their own soybean seed from Roundup Ready varieties. Monsanto has found it profitable to price Roundup Ready technology to achieve widespread adoption by soybean producers, and this allows farmers and consumers of soybean products to share in the benefits of the new technology. Over the long term scientist will be able to innovate around Monsanto's patent and the life of the patent is limited. Hence, the benefits from the Roundup Ready technology for soybeans is only partially appropriable to Monsanto or partially excludable.
Because of limited potential appropriability of discoveries that are of a pure public good nature, e.g., the discovery of the structure of DNA, the private sector will grossly underfund this type of research relative to the social optimum or not finance it at all (Huffman and Just 1999; Cornes and Sandler 1996) . Hence, the public sector can be expected to play a major role in financing fundamental discoveries that are of a pure public good nature. More applied and product/design or process/method oriented discoveries that the fundamental discoveries enable have higher expected appropriability through patenting, and the private sector can be expected to finance a major share of them, e.g., the development of bt cotton and corn, Round Up Ready Soybeans, bGH of bSt for dairy cows. Advances in technology, however, sometimes lead to advances in science to resolve unanticipated outcomes.
Positive externalities or spillovers are common with research and other public goods, and they frequently are a source of socially inefficient decisions on optimal provision. When a public good, say a scientific innovation, provides benefits outside the political jurisdiction that finances/provides it, and no compensation is paid by outsiders, positive externalities in the form of spillovers occur. Spillovers occur when the "economic jurisdiction" or impact area is larger than the political boundaries or the financing jurisdiction. For agricultural research (and other public goods), it is important to distinguish between "political or deciding" and "economic or benefitting" jurisdictions (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Olson 1969 Olson , 1986 . Serious social inefficiency arises in the form of underinvestment either when an economic jurisdiction is broader than the political jurisdiction (as above) in both examples or when the economic jurisdiction is a small subpart of a larger political jurisdiction and provision of research funds, e.g., is by collective action (Olson 1969 (Olson , 1986 , i.e., a local public good.
As illustrated by the above review, finance and conduct of agricultural research can be administered by the same or separate institutions, e.g., can be done "in-house" or "contracted Zucker and Darby (1997) discuss research adjustments and changes in the pharmaceutical industry resulting from the biotechnology revolution. They find that firms have little incentive to promote the "public interest." Much agricultural research, however, is not easily protected by intellectual property rights, or if it is, the expected return is too low to interest the private sector. Thus, society will be better off if the public sector undertakes basic research and correctly identifies and subsidizes agricultural research that produces socially valuable impure public goods that are not produced by the private sector optimally.
Some scientific discoveries have beneficiaries that are not defined geographically, and Olson (1986) suggests calling them the "clientele" and Cornes and Sandler (1996) suggest calling them a "club." With public agricultural research funded by collective action, scattered research clientele (or club members) increases greatly the cost of organizing to finance agricultural research, and as the number of members in the clientele group or club grows, the free-or easyrider problem generally causes the group to lose it power and to become political ineffective (Olson 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1996) . For these clientele groups to be politically effective, they must solve the free-rider problem.
One effective means of solving this problem is to obtain federal legislation requiring participation of target-group members. In the United States, the 1985 farm bill permitted agricultural commodity groups to hold a referendum for coverage by mandatory commodity check-off programs to finance commodity promotion and agricultural research. A commodity group is then designated to manage the check-off funds, e.g, the National Pork Council, the National Corn Growers Association, National Soybean Association, National Cattlemen's Association. In Canada and the United Kingdom, national legislation has also enabled producer commodity councils to funding research and other activities (Huffman and Just 1998b; Guitard 1985; Smith 1996; Thirtle et. al 1997) .
Private interest group financing of public agricultural research is socially efficient if (1) all of the beneficiaries of the research are included in the "group" and (2) the private financing does not adversely affect (i.e., crowd out) the amount of public resources allocated to other socially worthwhile agricultural research. Unfortunately, one or both of these conditions are seldom met.
First, the (potential) beneficiaries of agricultural research are generally much larger than any particular commodity group (or corporation). Notably over the long-run, a large share of the benefits of public agricultural research goes to consumers (see Alston and Pardey 1996, Ch. 5) . In contrast to the broad distributional benefits associated with public research, a large share (but not all) of the benefits of private sector agricultural research goes to the companies financing and conducting the research (Huffman and Evenson 1993) . Second, research as a production process has a large amount of ex ante uncertainty and public institutions that are under financial distress frequently look favorably on almost any outside source of funding. Thus, a private group is frequently able to contract with a public research institute to undertake a project for less than the expected cost which creates joint public-private financing. Hence, public funds that would otherwise have gone to other public agricultural research projects having greater public goods content are redirected by the joint venture.
From a public interest perspective, the key issue is the size of the social payoff for the joint public-private venture versus purely publicly financed projects which are foregone by the redirection of public resources to the joint venture project. If the social opportunity cost is low, then the redirection is socially good, but if the opportunity cost is high, society is worse off by these joint public-private ventures than if no private funding of public agricultural research occurred. See Ulrick, Furtan, and Schmitz (1986) for adverse effects of private funding of barley research, and Huffman and Just (1994) for adverse effects of federal grant, contract and cooperative agreement funding of public agricultural research on state agricultural total factor productivity. The displacement of public goods research by private or quasi-private goods research can be a significant "crowing out" effect that can undermine the willingness of taxpayers to support public goods research.
Critique of Economic Impacts of R&D
Many types of evaluations of public research (and extension) programs exist. Some count products produced or producers contacted, but economic impact analysis of a program/project attempts to associate benefits produced with economic cost. This means computing an internal rate of return, benefit-cost-ratio, or present value of benefits net of cost. Economic impact evaluations include ex ante evaluations (undertaken before the project or program is initiated) or ex post evaluations (undertaken after the project or program is initiated) or perhaps after it is complete. This critique focuses on ex post evaluations.
Much of the work on economic evaluation of research (and extension) has focused on the more difficult issue of obtaining estimates of the benefits. The two most common methods employed are analytical measures of producer and consumer surplus and econometric estimates of productivity or product functions.
Evenson (1998) summarizes the evidence from about 260 studies of all types containing an economic evaluation of benefit-cost of agricultural research. He reports that the median real internal-rate-of-return is 40 percent. Given that the real rate of return on a relatively riskless short-term Treasury Bill has historically been less than 2 percent, a 40 percent real rate of return is extremely large even after making some adjustment for riskiness of research investments. The distribution of internal-rate-of-returns is similar for difference evaluation procedures, and there is no evidence of any change in the internal-rate-of-return before and after 1985.
One check on the validity of estimates is to see if they are consistent with observed growth rate experience for agriculture. Suppose the investment rate in agricultural research is one percent of output and research has a trapezoidal-shaped distribution of impacts over time on agricultural output/productivity, then an internal-rate-of-return of 60 percent is possible with total factor productivity growth rates in the 1.5-2.5 range. For U .S. agriculture the latest USDA estimates of total factor productivity growth rate for 1948-1994 is 1.9 percent (Ball, Bureau, Nehring, and Somwaru 1997) , and for most western developed countries, the TFP growth rate falls in the range of 1.5-2.5 percent per year since 1973 -89 (OECD 1995 Furthermore, even when all relevant variables are included in an econometric analysis, multicollinarity makes it difficult to identify accurately the contribution of separate explanatory variables. Third, assumed distribution of R&D benefits over time is important to research benefit evaluation, but given the current state of knowledge and the data available, I believe that there is little to be learned from further examination of this issue. I will return to this topic later.
Research has other potentially important impacts beyond those revealed in benefit cost analysis. For example, research has been shown to have an effect on the optimal (profit maximizing) composition of inputs and outputs in production and more generally on the structure of agriculture. Huffman and Evenson (1989) showed, using state aggregate data for U.S. cash grain farms, that public and private crop research rotates the profit function so as to bias input use in favor of fertilizer and against farm labor and machinery inputs. Public research also biased the output composition of cash grain farms toward soybeans (relative to feed grains and wheat). In contrast, private agricultural research biased the output composition toward feed grains. U.S.
agriculture has also been adjusting to economy-wide market forces and changes in the government farm commodity programs.
In a later study, Huffman and Evenson (1999) identify econometrically the contribution of public technology policies (public research and extension and farmers' schooling), economy-wide market forces (private R&D and prices for fertilizer, machinery input, farm labor and non-farm labor), and government farm commodity programs to structural adjustment in U.S. agriculture (specialization, farm size, and part-time farming), and of structural adjustments to growth of productivity. The study shows that part of total factor productivity change in U.S. agriculture has been channeled through structural change, but more important to this paper is its implications about the impact of public technology policy on structural change. 
New Developments in Agricultural Science Policy and Emerging Trends
First, I discuss new developments in agricultural research policies in the United States and in other western developed countries. Second, I suggest emerging trends for the 21st century.
3
New Developments in Agricultural Science Policy
Three new development are identified and discussed briefly (also see Huffman and Just 1999b).
Development 1:
The rate of growth of public agricultural research expenditures has been reduced significantly. During 1971 During -1981 , the annual (compound) average growth rate of real agricultural research expenditures for these 18 western developed countries was a relatively large 2.9 percent, 3.2 percent for the Western European countries and 2.6 percent for the North American countries (table 1) . For all of the countries except Germany, the growth rate was positive. During 1981-1993, the growth rate for public agricultural research expenditures, however, was significantly lower by about 1 percentage point -1.9 percent for all 18 countries, 2.2 percent for the Western European countries, and 1.9 percent for the North American countries. During this latter period, three countries (Belgium, Greece, and Ireland) had negative growth in agricultural research expenditure, the U.K. had no net growth, and Canada had an average growth rate of only 0.26 percent. Over the two combined periods, Germany has almost no net growth in public agricultural research expenditures. Institute (BBSRI). The latter two institutes primarily operate competitive grants programs in "basic science" and in "public interest" research focused on food safety and environmental issues.
Scientists from a broad set of institutions are eligible to bid on HEI and BBSRI projects. In 1993/94, competitive grant funds for agricultural research increased to 20 percent of public funds allocated to agricultural research (but 80 percent continue to be allocated as program funds or block grants to agricultural research institutions). See Thirtle et al 1997.
In the U.S., the composition of the "regular federal" funding (i.e., Cooperative States
Research Service, CSRS, or Cooperative States Research, Education, and Extension Service, ESREES) and mechanism for allocating federal funds to the state agricultural experiment station system (and other cooperating state institutions) have changed. In 1887, when the SAES system was first given formal national government funding by passage of the Hatch Act, approximately 82 percent of the funding for the SAES system were from regular federal funds. This share trended downward to 65 percent in 1900, 22 percent in 1960, and 14 percent in 1990 but were larger in 1995 (15 percent). The exact mechanism for distributing "regular federal" funds has changed over time (Huffman and Evenson 1993, pp. 21-23; Alston and Pardey 1996, Ch. 2;  Committee on the Future of the Land Grant University System 1995, Ch. 6; Fuglie et. al. 1996) .
Historically a legislated formula for allocating federal appropriations to the SAES system has been central to national government funding of public agricultural research. Initially every state received an equal sized national government appropriation, but over the period 1935-55, the formula was modified to also depend on a state's share of total U.S. farm population and total U.S. rural people. After strong encouragement from the National Research Council, the USDA In 1900, virtually all of the 64 percent of SAES funding from the national government came from USDA formula/program funds (Huffman and Evenson 1993) , but in 1980 the share from Hatch, Regional, and non-grant funds was 56 percent and in 1996 only 32 percent (Huffman and Just 1999a) . In 1982, about 3.3 percent of regular federal funds for SAES were distributed by competitive grants, but this share increased to 8.6 percent in 1990 and 16.6 percent in 1996 Evenson 1993, Huffman and Just 1999a) . Hence, "regular federal" funds for agricultural research are being allocated increasingly by competitive grants and less by formula or block grants to state (see also Buttel this volume). The trend is strongest in the United Kingdom, the U.S., France, the Netherlands, and Canada.
In the United Kingdom, the recent redirection of agricultural research funds away from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries to the Higher Education Institutes and establishment of new statutory bodies (commodity groups) to fund agricultural research represents a new emphasis on nontraditional agricultural research funding (Smith 1996; Thirtle, et. al. 1997 ).
In 1993/94, the HEI funds represented 15 percent of expenditures on U.K. public agricultural research, which was considerably larger than the 5.5 percent share in 1987/88.
In the U.S. at both the state and federal level, nontraditional sources of resources and technology transfer have been developed recently. Over the past two decades, SAES scientists in the U.S. have turned increasingly to "non-regular federal" and private sector sources. In 1960, the share of SAES system funding coming from nontraditional federal government sources was 7.6 percent, and it has grown--11 percent in 1980, 12 percent in 1990, and 15 percent in 1995 (see Evenson 1993, USDA 1996) . These funds were distributed by the USDA in contracts and cooperative agreements and by the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Public Health Service, and other agencies primarily by competitive grants.
During the past decade, U.S. federal laboratories have greatly increased the amount of collaborative research with the private sector. The 1986 Technology Transfer Act established a mechanism, a CRADA, through which federal and non-federal researchers could collaborate (Fuglie et al. 1996, p. 55) . This legislation permits federal laboratory to enter into CRADA's with universities, private companies, non-federal government entities, and others. The principle objective of a CRADA, however, is to link the pretechnology research capacity of federal laboratories with the commercial research and marketing expertise of the private sector. Under a CRADA, a federal laboratory may provide personnel, equipment, and laboratory privileges. A collaborator with a federal laboratory may contribute funds directly to a federal laboratory and the cooperating institution receives the rights of first refusal to any joint discovery and may be given exclusive access to data from a joint project (Fuglie et. al. 1996, p.56) . CRADA activity has increased rapidly after 1987, but the private sector CRADA resources are less than 1 percent of the budget of the Agricultural Research Service of the USDA (Huffman and Just 1999b) .
In France, the growth of systematic/program funding for research in national institutes has not been fast enough to cover the cost of experimentation. Scientists are now encouraged to undertake cooperative or joint venture projects with public (regional governmental) and private sector partners. In the Netherlands, there has been a large increase in the number of publicprivate partnerships for agricultural research, including the private sector investing significantly in resources of the public institutions. In Italy, funding of public agricultural research by the National Research Council, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and Ministry of Research and Universities represent nontraditional sources (Huffman and Just 1999b) .
In Canada, since the early 1980s, commodity, producer, processor, and trade associations have been collecting funds for financing agricultural research. These groups include the Canadian Horticultural Council, the Canola Council of Canada, the Brewing and Malting Barley Research Institute, and the Canadian and Western Grains Councils (Guitard 1985) . However, a new agricultural research policy was established in 1994, the Matching Investment Initiative (MII).
Under this program, the federal government matches up to dollar-for-dollar the private sector's contributions to joint research ventures. The MII was implemented by the federal government to offset declines in federal funding for agricultural research. Also, new funds for public research are coming from commodity check-off programs for wheat, barley, and beef.
Although there is clearly increased emphasis on obtaining private sector funding for public agricultural research institutions, the share of the total funds that these institutions research from the private sector is small. Among the western developed countries, the U.S. receives the largest share of private sector funding of public agricultural research, 7.5 percent in 1960, 9.2 percent in 1980, and 14.3 percent in 1996 (Huffman and Just 1999a,b) . Private sector funding of research in public institutions raises a number of political-economic issues that do not appear in private sector funding of its own activities.
Emerging Trends for the 21st Century
Based on consideration of factors introduced earlier in the paper, emerging trends in financing, organization, and management of research are now identified.
New Organizations. New political jurisdictions will be formed to finance particular types of agricultural research in the public sector, strengthening of IPRs to increase the breadth of R&D activities undertaken by the private sector will occur, and public research will become increasingly concentrated in general/basic and pretechnology research areas.
First, new political jurisdictions will be formed for the purpose of financing agricultural research producing impure public goods benefitting primarily the jurisdiction. This will become an important new funding source for public research institutions. These jurisdictions will include new alliances across countries and subregions within large countries. Small countries will look actively for potential alliances with other, especially larger countries, that they can join. They are too small to capture significant benefits from pretechnology and general science research supporting agriculture. Furthermore, they will increasingly see that it is to their long term advantage to open markets so that they can benefit from the technically advances made in other countries. Within large countries, a mosaic of overlapping political jurisdictions may develop;
they have worked well for the provision of many other local public goods and services, e.g., education, water control districts.
Second, intellectual property rights will be further strengthened to increase the share of total agricultural research, e.g., in biotechnology and new information systems, that is financed and conducted in the private sector. Drawing upon a recently published patent rights index for 111 countries over 1960-1990, Table 1 shows the patent rights index of the U.S. (and other western developed countries) strengthened move rapidly after 1975. Given that the upper limit 4 of the index is 5, the table shows that there is potential for further strengthening the patent rights index in the U.S. (and other western developed countries). This would make it possible for the private sector to provide more of its own research needs, and we believe that this is the best direction for the private sector to channel resources for research.
Third, private sector financing of agricultural research will not grow in importance as a funding source for public institutions in western developed countries. During the 21st century, it will become clear that joint public-private sector financing of joint-ventures research venture may look like good opportunities, but they actually come at high social cost due to crowding out other socially preferred projects. The private interests of companies and commodity groups are seldom well aligned with the social good or public interest and few companies and clubs are willing to make unrestricted research grants to public research institutions or scientists as Revlon has supported cancer research over the past decade at UCLA Medical School. This creates a major conflict with the interests of taxpayers that provide a majority of the support of public agricultural research institutions. Furthermore, because we see no evidence that public agricultural research funds are allocated so as to equalize expected marginal returns, joint public-private ventures come at a high opportunity cost when they redirect public funds to areas that have a lower social rates of return, or crowd out other socially worthwhile projects.
As the stock of knowledge has grown and intellectual property rights to scientific discoveries have been strengthened, the division of labor between research undertaken by the public and private sector has shifted. The private sector now finds it profitable to undertake an increasing share of the applied and pretechnology research but seldom to undertake research on basic scientific discoveries. Thus, the public sector has largely withdrawn from direct competition with the private sector in applied research. The result is that the public sector is allocating an increasing share of its research to discoveries in basic and pretechnology sciences.
Some areas of applied research, however, remain privately unprofitable, e.g., research on environmental and natural resource quality, food safety and human nutrition, agricultural policy, and minor crops. Thus, there continues to be a need for selective applied research by the public sector in socially worthwhile areas.
Overall, the national agricultural R&D systems of "large countries" that have developed as a system of shared public and private finance and performance of agricultural research and the public component is decentralized between the nation and state/provincial governments, e.g., the
United States and Germany, are best positioned for meeting the R&D needs of their residents in the 21st century. These systems are better positioned for financing and conducting agricultural research to meet the changing demand for local or impure public goods than the national financed, administered, and conducted systems, e.g., France. The decentralized systems are large enough to obtain many of the benefits from basic or pretechnology research. Small countries must strive to improve their access to new technological innovations by forming new political alliances with other countries, being open to technology transfer, and to imports of technically enhanced goods.
See Huffman and Just 1999b for further discussion and rationale.
As we conceptualize the structure and organization of the R&D system for agriculture for the 21st century, a pictorial representation may help to illustrate it. A linear organization of science and technology is now widely in disfavor by the history of science profession, e.g., see
Rosenberg 1994, and never had much credibility among the founding fathers of the U.S. public agricultural research system (see Huffman and Evenson 1993) . By a linear organization of science and technology, I mean that advances in science lead fairly directly, although with some lag, to advances in technology without any feedback in the opposite direction. The newly accepted perspective by the history of science profession is that considerable knowledge is generated at the technological frontier and that advances in technology feedback to cause advances and refinements in science. Thus, the relationship is bi-directional; advances in science lead to advances in technology, but advances in technology also lead to advances in science. In particular, because of the complexity of nature, it is impossible for scientists to anticipate all of the advances in knowledge that are required to make new technologies commercially successful (see Rosenberg 1994 for a discussion of a number of examples in high technology). In agriculture, there is a long history of practical problems driving the curiosity of a significant share of scientists, especially those engaged in applied research in agricultural experiment stations and the Agricultural Research Service (see Huffman and Evenson 1993; Huffman and Just 1994) . This occurred largely because most agricultural scientists have had agricultural roots, and scientists and farmers saw the importance of feedback between them. Huffman and Just (1994) have shown that the upstream exposure to farmers' problems is most productive for scientists engaged in applied research. Furthermore, both a system of applied agricultural sciences and methods for training agricultural scientists were needed and developed during the 20th century to provide the steady source of innovations needed to support the modernization of U.S. agriculture.
The organization for the new R&D system for agriculture is presented in Figure 1 . With strengthening of intellectual property rights that occurred at the end of the 20th century and will continue into the 21st century, the division of labor between research that will be financed and largely conducted by the public and private sectors will continue to shift. In particular, as the private sector invests more heavily in a range of activities in Level IV and occasionally in Level V, this will release resources that the public sector had been investing here to be to deployed to Levels V and VI. This means that during the 21st century, the public sector financed research will become increasingly concentrated in the general/core and pretechnology sciences and in a few applied research areas that the public sector does not find profitable but are socially worthwhile.
Management of Research and Allocation of Research Funds. Major changes are expected
during the 21st century in the management of agricultural research, the philosophy of funding institutions, and mechanisms for allocating/distributing funds. The changes will be driven largely by new and emerging information about the relative economic efficiencies of different management and funding practices, e.g., see Just 1998a, Levitt 1995. Scientists employed by research institutions will increasingly receive incentive compensation based on the quality of their research or value of the research payoff. The principles of optimal contracting from principal-agent theory, incorporating ex ante uncertainty in the research production process, asymmetric information on scientists' effort, and payoffs being described as the "best" of scientists' output rather than total output, will guide these decisions.
They imply that administrators will increasingly implement a partial incentive contract with scientists that involves both an optimal compensation guarantee and an optimal performance incentive. The performance incentive should be defined by the characteristics that matter in valuing the R&D payoff to the employing institution. More basically, what matters in valuing the R&D payoff will most likely be rooted in the values of the political jurisdiction or clientele financing the institution (or research). Scientists then exert the optimal level of effort and the research institution maximizes its expected R&D payoff net of the wage bill for scientists. See
Huffman and Just (1998a) for greater details and discussion.
Emerging trends in the transfer of resources from research-financing institutions to research-performing institutions and scientists will show a resurgence in program and institutional funding, rapid growth and popularity of quality-based incentive contracts, and reduced emphasis on peer-review competitive-grant systems. With quality-based incentive contracting in place between research administrators and scientists, program, institutional, and formula funding of research will again be seen as a relatively efficient mechanism for funding agricultural research.
Quality-based incentive contracting will become a relative popular mechanism for allocation funds from newly established political jurisdictions that finance research to research performing institutions and scientists. Principal-agent theory and incentive contracting for research implies that optimal contracts have a quality-based (and not a cost-based) incentive.
Contracts for research where quality of output is of upmost importance should not include cost incentives. Given that scientists' effort is not contractible and output is uncertain, an incentive to cut cost unduly cuts scientists' effort and quality of the output and the value of the research payoff. Furthermore, contracts will be increasingly defined in terms of broad performance attributes that reflect the value of the research payoffs to the funding institutions or financing jurisdiction rather than specifications of a particular innovation. This added breadth can be expected to reduce riskiness of projects to scientists and induce increased research effort (Huffman and Just 1998a) .
Peer-review competitive granting systems will lose their glamor during the 21st century as the imperfections and inefficiencies in this type of research contract become more widely known.
Although peer-reviewed competitive grant programs are popular with the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health, they have important imperfections and deficiencies as a research contract. The problems are associated with ex ante uncertainty of the research production process and asymmetric information on scientists' effort and ability (see Huffman and Just 1998; 1999a) . For example, a research proposal has little direct value in the R&D payoff of a project, but a peer-reviewed grant system places the quality incentive on the research proposal rather than the actual discovery. The research output is observed only after the award is given and its quality is imperfectly correlated with the proposal quality.
Additional problems arise from the heavy externalities that federal competitive grants programs impose on scientists and their institutions. The externalities are because of a system in which the federal funding agencies do not explicitly finance all of scientists' time. If scientists receive no compensation for proposal writing or are compensated only for successful proposals, the incentive is to write proposals for work that has already been completed or to write proposals that appear attractive but commit little. The resources required for unsuccessful proposals must be covered by the scientists' institutions possibly at high opportunity costs in terms of teaching time or reduced research output from other research funds. The proposal evaluation and ranking process also consume scientists' time that is not compensated by granting agencies. The low overhead rate, e.g., 19 percent upper limit on National Research Initiative grants through 1998 and 14 percent starting in 1999, is a deterrent to grant participation by some institutions.
Finally, because of their small numbers, the standards of reviewers and review panels are more narrow, conservative, and/or possibly short-sighted than the broad scientific community on acceptable research methods and potentially attainable discoveries. Thus, the "peer panels" tend to impose homogeneity of approaches (which reduces the diversity of sampling) or to require preliminary research evidence (which retards the research process). A socially desirable national research funding mechanism for basic and pretechnology science should not unload the riskiness of scientific discovery onto institutions or funding mechanisms that have relatively higher risk premiums. Many of these issues are addressed in a recent General Accounting Office report (U.S. GAO). These are problems that could potentially be mitigated in the federal peer-reviewed competitive grant programs.
Given that research discoveries are uncertain, duplicative research efforts by scientists working independently have merit. With asymmetric information about the research production process, the value of the information effect from scientists working independently on the "same project" is strengthened by similarity (correlation) of research output. However, the information effect is only of value as it is incorporated into scientists incentive schemes that induce more effort and higher quality research. During the 21st century, this information will be increasingly used by administrators in setting incentives for scientists. Given the decentralized organization of agricultural research in the United States (see Huffman and Just 1998) , sufficient duplication of objectives among research projects conducted across the country seems to exists so that the information value of duplication is low compared to the sampling value. If so, then the inducement of similarity in research efforts through competitive funding has a detrimental effect when the ultimate social payoff depends on the best rather than the total quantity of scientists' output.
Given the principles developed in Huffman and Just 1998, agricultural science policy during the 21st century will increasingly recognize the social efficiency of funding public agricultural research through formula and program funding of diverse research institutions that offer optimal incentives to the scientists they employ. Short research proposals (e.g., a few pages in length) covering reasonably long periods of time (e.g., 3 -5 years) serve sufficiently to permit administrators to monitor, review, and manage -if the more crucial steps are taken to implement optimal incentives based on attributes of value to the institution. Research proposals should state the objectives sufficiently to allow the administrator to verify that anticipated payoffs fit the criteria that are used in valuing the R&D payoff of the institution. Under the new management of agricultural research, scientists' effort and time for reviewing and evaluating will be allocated exclusively to assessing the quality of research output, e.g., reviewing manuscripts for publication and evaluating research payoffs, and not to research proposals.
Issues in Assessing Econometrically the Contribution of Research to Productivity
An econometric production (or transformation) function approach to evaluating the economic impact of agricultural research and extension foregoes interesting details of specific events and focuses on identifying the relationship between total output or total factor productivity and agricultural research and extension investments. Here productivity growth, provided it is measured correctly, is related to past investments in research and possibly other variables, and an attempt is made to estimate econometrically the part of total output or total factor productivity growth that can be attributed to research. The development of this methodology has evolved over the past three decades, and Griliches has pioneered in this area. A 1979 article of his is especially useful for my purposes (Griliches 1979) .
A Model
As a framework to fix ideas, the level and growth of productivity can best be discussed from a production (or transformation) function perspective: Y=F(x , x ,...). The function F( ) 1 2 describes the relationship between inputs and final output Y. Productivity, A=Y/X, is then defined as the ratio of output to some input index X of inputs under the control of producers.
Following Griliches (1979) , the determinants of productivity can then be organized around (1) the list of variables included in X, (2) the algebraic form assumed for F( ), (3) the particular empirical observations chosen to representY and X, and (4) the econometric methods used to infer the properties of F( ) from the data. Several potentially serious problems, however, exist. First, measurement issues arise for both outputs and inputs, but, in agriculture, historically quality changes and imperfect competition in inputs have dominated quality change and imperfect competition in output(s). This, however, may change with new biotechnology providing the potential for a large increase in differentiated agricultural outputs, e.g., protein enhanced grain, oil enhanced/modified soybeans, pharmaceutical drugs from cow urine, etc. Second, serious difficulties in econometric inference result from the fact that most of the variables of interest tend to move together over time and possibly over space, making it especially hard to disentangle their separate effects. Third, the direction of causation or potential feedback in the system further complicates estimations.
To better focus on key issues, specify the production function as:
where X is an index of conventional inputs, e.g., labor, capital and land inputs, K is a measure of the current state of technical knowledge and related to current and past investments in research, and µ represents all other unmeasured determinants of output or productivity. Now A=Y/X is the level of total factor productivity. Furthermore, let's assume the relationship between K and current and past research expenditures is of the general form:
where W( ) is a lag polonominal and B the backshift operator describing the relationship between K and current and past expenditures on research, R. < is another set of unmeasured effects affecting the transformation of research expenditures into technical knowledge:
A very important set of issues associated with equation (1) In particular, many of the simplifying assumptions that we frequently make to facilitate estimation have strong implications. For example, writing the production function as Y=F(X,K,µ) implies a single output, but more importantly, it implies separability of conventional inputs X from technical knowledge (or the current and past research expenditures).
Writing W(B)R as a linear function of part research investments implies that the relationship t between research expenditure and technical knowledge is unchanging over time, i.e., there is not significant change in the composition of research activities or efficiency of research organization and management.
To easily develop some further implications, lets forego a generalized form of the production function, and adopt the Cobb-Douglas specification:
where A is a constant, C is capital input, L is labor input, M is land input, t is trend, and ", $, (, * *, and J are unknown parameters of interest. Next lets assume where s is shares, then measured total factor productivity is:
Note that TFP depends not only on technical knowledge K, trend t in the unmeasured factors, and the random component µ, but also the level of conventional inputs X. Only if constant returns to scale in conventional inputs exists does "+$+(-1=0 and X drop-out of equation (5). Moreover, any measurement error in one of the conventional inputs is transmitted directly to the productivity measure. For example, if "true" labor input is L=q N , where q is average "quality" per worker
and N the total number of workers, then if N rather than L is used in the construction of X, L L measured productivity will be given by
where .
This example helps clarify the point that much of the discussion in the literature about why differences exist across studies of total factor productivity misses a central point. Differences are largely due to methods of construction, e.g., some researchers choose to incorporate quality change of inputs into their input indexes and others do not. Too much is frequently made of differences in TFP measures across studies without looking below the surface at the nature of the underlying methodology.
Technical Knowledge and Research Capital
The production of knowledge is a complex process (see Huffman and Evenson 1993) , and I focus on important empirical issues. We can re-write equation (2) as:
( 7) where W(B)R is the lag function for past agricultural research expenditures, J t is the trend 2 component of all other factors on the state of knowledge, and L is a zero mean random component of knowledge. Now substituting equation (7) into equation (4) (Duvick 1986; Huffman and Evenson 1994, Ch. ) suggest some type of distorted bell-shaped frequency of use pattern.
The trapezoidal shaped-lag pattern adapted by Evenson (1980) , Huffman and Evenson (1993) and others is consistent with this distorted bell shape. Geometrically declining lag patterns, including infinitely long lag-lengths, however, are not consistent with this evidence. Furthermore, given the available data for TFP analysis, it is asking too much of the model and data to be able to identify the lag pattern without any prior restrictions.
Third, the technical knowledge impacting agriculture in one locality is derived from its "own research activity" but also from knowledge "borrowed" from agricultural research conducted in other locations and possibly other industries/sectors. These are positive externalities or research "spillovers." Intra-industry spillovers, however, cannot be examined with national aggregate data, but they can be examined using regional or state aggregate data. Because much of agricultural research is an impure public good, it makes no sense to simply aggregate research expenditure over other states expected to impact agriculture in any given state. Rather, the total knowledge stock impacting TFP in state i can best be represented as:
where K is the stock of knowledge produced in state j obtained by correctly laging its own j current and past agricultural research expenditures. w is the "weighting" or "distance" function, ij and it can be interpreted as the effective fraction of knowledge in state j that is borrowed by state i. It seems reasonable that w become smaller as the "distance" or "dissimilarity of agriculture" ij between i and j increases. Thus, we need an additional spatial-lag distribution to construct the stock of borrowed knowledge. For example, Huffman and Evenson (1993) use a geoclimatic region map as a tool for constructing spatial weights. Other methods also exist, but as with identifying time-lag distributions, the available data and models cannot be expected to identify spatial lag patterns without some type of prior restrictions.
Thus, creating the knowledge variable on research stock requires three decisions:
(1) choose the relevant expenditures (in each state) that can reasonably be expected to impact TFP, (2) choose the length and shape of the time lag distribution, and (3) choose the spatial lag distributions?
Other Issues
The problem of identifying the parameters of the TFP model is made difficult by the fact that many of the variables are highly correlated or near-multicollinary. In particular, one cannot expect to obtain definitive estimates of these parameters using a single cross section of data over time, i.e. using national aggregate data over time. However, by using state aggregate data, we can obtain much wider variation in the past experiences, and the cross-sectional variation that exists from pooling data for 40 or 48 states into a panel is a major asset in trying to identify the parameters of the TFP model. However, prior information about time and spatial lag patterns are still essential.
With the changes in the organization and management of agricultural research that have been predicted to emerge in the 21st century, our life becomes increasingly difficult for conducting good econometric examinations of the contributions of research to TFP. First, the private sector is expected to carry a larger share of the total investment in agricultural research.
As IPRs are strengthened, the private sector undertakes research somewhat similar in nature to what the public sector conducted in the past. Thus, the composition of private research will change, and it will become increasingly important to include a private agricultural research variable in econometric TFP analysis.
Second, the composition of public agricultural research will change-less applied research because of the larger role being played by the private sector and more pre-technology and general/basic science research. Hence, it will become impossible to defend the assumption that total public agricultural research expenditures are homogenous over time as needed for the technology knowledge variable. More attention to disaggregation, e.g., into applied and pretechnology science research, and construction of public agricultural research stock indexes will be required.
Third, public agricultural research funding and management methods have been changing since about 1980, and they are expected to evolve in a different direction during the 21st century.
Hence, these changes are expected to add an additional dimension of heterogeneity to the public agricultural research expenditures in the 21st century. They further complicate the construction of meaningful and relatively measurement-error free measures of the relevant technical knowledge or research stock variables for explaining TFP in agriculture.
Finally, given the difficult task that we face in conducting econometric TFP analyses, we should be humble in our claims of accomplishments. They are at best onlly rough indicators of impacts and grow in credibility as similar evidence accumulates.
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed a number of issues in the finance, organization, and impact analysis of agricultural research. Here I highlight implications for the 21st century. I believe that the economics of agricultural research financing and impact analysis will draw heavily upon refinements in the theory of public goods dealing with impure public goods. Public agricultural research will continue to be financed primarily by taxing payers of political jurisdictions, i.e., the national and state governments, but also new political jurisdictions established solely for collecting and distributing funds for research. Private sector financing of public research institutions will not increase because of major conflicts in missions and goals. Intellectual property rights will be gradually strengthened and an increasing share of total agricultural research in the U.S. will be financed and conducted by the private sector.
The returns to investing in public agricultural research will continue to be large and shown to be large. Research on research interests will focus on trying to identify the impacts of different major components of public agricultural research, e.g., applied versus pretechnology, to incorporate interregional and perhaps intern-industry spillovers. A major effort will also go into constructing good private sector agricultural research variables, to incorporating them into future TFP analyses, and to examining the potential interactions between private research, public research, and extension. The large investment that has been made in constructing good measures of state TFP will prove to be a rich area for pursuing these investigations because state data provide a much wider range of experiences than national aggregate data.
Public agricultural research expenditures will grow, funded largely by expenditures from new political jurisdictions. As the private sector increases its share of the total investment in U.S.
agricultural research and invests largely in applied research, the public sector will pull out of all areas where it is in direct competition with the private sector. This will release funds that will be allocated to research in basic, general and pretechnology research that is unlikely to lead directly to marketable products and in applied areas like food safety and nutrition, environmental-resource quality, and policy.
During the 21st century, agricultural science policy will re-discover the social efficiency of distributing a major part of federal funds for agricultural research to the states by formula and program funds. Other federal and regional public funds will increasingly be allocated to public research institutions and scientists through quality-based incentive contracts. The social inefficiencies of peer-review competitive grant programs will become widely known and accepted, and competitive research grant programs will lose their glamor. The competitive grant systems that remain will be redesigned to remove the large negative externalities they impose on scientists and their institutions. In particular, these programs will increasingly pay for research proposal writing and reviewing. Overall, I believe the 21st century will be an exciting time for agricultural research and those interested in trying to uncover its many remaining secrets. The new terminator gene recently developed jointly by USDA-ARS and Delta and Pine Land Company, and now owned by Monsanto, could change the economics of bin-run seed because it disrupts the ability of a seed to reproduce itself. This could increase the expected private return to wheat varietal development, which has been an area that the private sector had largely dropped.
2. This is an example of the sometimes suggested linear and uni-directional relationship from advances in science to advances in technology. Although this may be a good representation for some of the advances in biotechnology, it does not hold generally. I return to this issue later in the paper.
3.
In the United States and Canada, agricultural science policy developed long before general science policy, and it has continued to be separate (Schultz 1980; Huffman and Evenson 1993; Guitard 1985) .
4.
The overall index is derived by Ginarte and Park (1997) from five separate indexes for:
(1) extent of coverage, (2) membership in international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) duration of protection. For example, loss of protection means 'working' requirements, compulsory licensing, and revocation of patents. Duration is the share of 20 years that a granting country gives protection. Each of the five components was given a value between 0 and 1 by the authors for each country and year, and a country's patent-rights index is the summation over these values, taking values between 0 and 5.
5.
We can think of a fraction of current agricultural research expenditure as being a net addition to the social stock of knowledge capital or that some fraction of the pre-existing stock of knowledge capital is replaced annually. Furthermore, because a significant share of current research is redundant, gross expenditures are an inaccurate measure of net additions to knowledge.
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